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lNT:BRNATIONAL LAw-Ar.IENs-CoNF1scATION OF ALmN ENEMY PROPERTY
-ALIEN ENEMY CHARACTER OF SHINTo SHRINE IN HAwAII- Plaintiff, a Hawaiian corporation, brought suit under section 9 of the Trading with the Enemy
Act1 for the return of real and personal property vested in 1948 under authority
of section S(b).2 Evidence was introduced to show that plaintiff's members
were largely alien Japanese; that, prior to December 7, 1941, plaintiff operated
what purported to be a Shinto shrine in Honolulu where three Japanese gods
were worshiped; that the shrine looked like a Shinto shrine and was in some re-

150 U.S.C. (1946) Appx. §9(a): "Any person not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right, or title in any money or other property which may have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian or seized
by him ..• may file .•. a notice of his claim ••• in the district court of the United States
for the district in which such claimant resides, or, if a corporation, where it has its principal
place of business ••• , to establish the interest, right, title, or debt so claimed. • • ."
2 50 U.S.C. (1946) Appx. §5(b): " ••• any property or interest of any foreign countxy
or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in
such agency or person as may be designated ••• by the President. •. .'' Exec. Order 9095,
50 U.S.C. (1946) Appx. §6 note, delegated this power to the World War II Alien Property Custodian.
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spects operated like one. It was further shown that plaintiff's members had no
real understanding of the tenets of Shintoism as it existed in Japan; that in
Japan Shintoism had been distorted and used as an ideological weapon against
Japan's enemies; and that plaintiff had ties of love and affection with the Shintoist organization in Japan. The court found as a fact that plaintiff was not
controlled, directly or indirectly, :financially or ideologically, by the Japanese
government, and that, whatever ties with Japan might have existed before or
during the war, MacArthur's order of 1945, providing that Shintoism would no
longer be recognized as a state religion, divested the Japanese government of any
control over Shintoism anywhere in the world. Held, "the plaintiff has proven
itself eligible under the Act to have a judicial order directing the Cusfodian to
return to it the vested property ... it will be so ordered...." The evidence disclosed no enemy taint, and the vesting was a violation of the :first amendment of
the Constitution of the United States. Kotohira Jinsha v. McGrath, (D.C.
Hawaii 1950) 90 F. Supp. 892.
Finding the uncertainties of the applicable international law3 inadequate to
deal with the necessities of war, Congress passed the Trading with the Enemy
Act of 19174 which defined the extent of the government's power to deal with private enemy property and detailed the methods by which the power could be exercised.5 An objective of the act was to give power to the Alien Enemy Property Custodian to "seize" such property,6 but under the act corporations characterized as
"enemy" were limited to those which were not incorporated in the United States
and which were incorporated or doing business in an enemy country.7 At the begin8 In the absence of significant war-time experience and practice in the century before
World War I and the conflicting views of the writers in the field made the status of
international law with respect to the right to confiscate enemy property and the limitation of
the right inherent in the problem of defining enemy character impossible to determine. A
discussion of these problems is found in Lourie, " 'Enemy' under the Trading with the
Enemy Act and Some Problems of International Law," 42 lvhca. L. R:sv. 383 (1943). On
the problems in international law created by the Trading with the Enemy Act, see Turlington, 36 AM.. J. lNr. L. 460 (1942).
440 Stat. L. 411 (1917).
5 For an analysis and history of the act, see Lourie, "'Enemy' under the Trading with
the Enemy Act and Some Problems in International Law,'' 42 lvhca. L. R:sv. 205 (1943);
also, 18 ST. Jomis L. R:sv. 56 (1943). On the policy of the act see Borchard, "The Treatment of Enemy Property,'' 34 GEo. L.J. 389 (1946); Sommerich, "A Brief Against Confiscation,'' 11 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 152 (1945); Rubin, '"Inviolability' of Enemy Private
Property," 11 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 166 (1945).
6 50 U.S.C. (1946) Appx. §7(c): " .•• property ... belonging to or held for, by, on
account of, or on behalf of, for the benefit of, an enemy or ally of enemy • . . may be
seized by the Alien Property Custodian..•." Cloaking devices were not ignored under the
old act; such companies were blacklisted by the Custodian, but the method was not adequate to deal with the complexities of the situation. 51 YALE L.J. 1388 (1942).
7 Behn, Miller and Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457, 44 S.Ct. 623 (1925); HamburgAmerican Line v. United States, 277 U.S. 138, 48 S.Ct. 470 (1928). The act itself defined
the term "enemy" in 50 U.S.C. (1946) Appx. §2(a) as "any individual, partnership, or
other body of individuals, ... resident within the territory (including that occupied by the
military and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident
outside the United States and doing business within such territory, and any corporation
incorporated within such territory of any nation with which the United States is at war or

1951]

RECENT DECISIONS

1243

ning of World War II, Congress, recognizing that German and Japanese corporations were prepared to evade the seizure provisions of the act through the use
of "cloaking" devices, attempted to broaden the area of the act's applicability to
corporations by providing the power to vest "any property or interest of any for- ·
eign country or national thereof."8 The Custodian was slow to investigate the
amendment's implications, 9 but by 1947, through the Supreme Court's decision
in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp}1° it was clear that the narrow test of the
earlier cases had been abandoned. That case involved a vesting of Swiss-owned
stock in an American corporation, by hypothesis, property free of any connection
with the enemy. Three alternatives were available to the Court: (I) to hold the
vesting invalid under the decided cases respecting the corporate entity;11 (2) to
hold the vesting valid under a literal interpretation of section 5(b), thereby allowing the vesting of interests of friendly aliens;12 (3) to hold the vesting invalid
under some intermediate criterion allowing the custodian to "pierce the corporate
veil" in some instances but precluding the right to appropriate property identified with friendly nations. The Court chose to adopt the third approach, using
what it termed the test of "enemy taint," but, because of the peculiarities of the
fact situation, it was unnecessary to define the term.13 The principal case is the
first reported decision, outside of the retrial of the U ebersee case, in which an
attempt has been made to apply the criterion of "enemy taint" to a specific fact
situation. Finding enemy taint in the U ebersee case, on retrial, the Court explained that it would "look not only to circumstances which indicate enemy ownincorporated within any country other than the United States and doing business within
such territory." On the development of this doctrine and a comparison with contemporaneous development on the subject in England see Norum, "Determinattion of Enemy Character of Corporations," 24 AM. J. INT. L. 310 (1930). The act as interpreted was declarative of the common law with respect to the enemy character of corporations. 20 TEX. L.
RBv. 746 (1942).
8 Supra note 2. 55 Stat. L. 838 (1941). For discussion of the relationship between
this act and the original act of 1917 see Bishop, "Judicial Construction of the Trading with
the Enemy Act," 62 HARv. L. RBv. 721 (1949); 56 YALB L.J. 1068 (1947); 55 YALE L.J.
836 (1946); Dulles, ''The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian," 28 CoRN.
L.Q. 245 (1943). In Draiger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 49 F. Supp.
215, it was held that section 9(a) (supra note 1), giving non-enemies a right of action to
recover in cases of wrongful seizure, applied to vestings under section 5(b) despite the inconsistency in language. The act was originally held constitutional because an opportunity
for judicial review was provided: Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 41 S.Ct. 293 (1921).
On this point see McNulty, "Constitutionality of Alien Property Controls," 11 LAW &
CoNTBM. PROB. 135 (1945); Wechsler, "Constitutionality of Alien Property Controls: A
Comment on the Problem of Remedies," 11 LAw & CoNTBM. PROB. 149 (1945). The
Draiger decision is accepted in the principal case.
9 See Berman, "Cartels and Enemy Property," 11 LAw & CoNTBM. PROB. 109 (1945);
18 ST. JoHN's L. RBv. 56 (1943); Lourie, "'Enemy' under the Trading with the Enemy
Act and Some Problems of International Law,'' 42 MICH. L. RBv. 383 (1943).
10 332 U.S. 480, 68 S.Ct. 174 (1947).
11 See note 7 supra.
12 Note 2 supra.
1 3 See discussion of the Uebersee case in Bishop, "Judicial Construction of the Trading
with the Enemy Act," 62 HARv. L. RBv. 721 at 749-753 (1949).
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ership or control, but also to connections or association with enemy interests."14
Yet in the principal case it was decided that certain connections with Japan were
immaterial in the absence of proof of enemy control. Despite the express rejection of control as dogma in the first case and the failure directly to acknowledge it
as the determinant in the second~ the two decisions indicate the use of a test of
control familiar in other areas of the law dealing with corporations,15 viz., the
rejected alternative in the early American decisions, 16 long accepted in England
in dealing with corporations and enemy property.17 A different approach to this
problem has been suggested in other recent cases.18 Suits under section 9(a) are
suits in equity; the theory is that the use of cloaking devices constitutes a misuse
of property in an attempt to defraud, and by analogy to the clean-hands doctrine the aid of a court of equity cannot be invoked to enforce rights in such
property. The use of the control test has the advantage of allowing a direct
decision on the merits on the basis of a familiar, if (characteristically) nebulous
concept. The application of the standard to the principal case indicates that
an ideological affinity with the enemy is not enough to constitute control without some manifestation of power, economic or political, to direct the use of the
disputed property to its own ends. In finding a violation of the first amendment,
the case follows the U ebersee decision in holding that an extension of the Custodian's power to non-enemy aliens is not justified under the act and would be.
an infringement of rights guaranteed to aliens under the United States Constitution.

Jean Engstrom,. S. Ed.

14 Uebersee Finaz-Korporation v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 602. The
court found that German nationals had a usufructuary interest in the property and that the
genuineness of the alleged neutral interest had not been shown to its satisfaction.
15 A closely analogous situation in which the control test is used is in prize cases in
admiralty. See Norem, "Determination of Enemy Character of Corporations," 24 AM.. J.
INr. L. 310 at 325-330 (1930).
16 See note 7 supra.
17The test was first adopted by judicial decision in Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre
and Rubber (Great Britain) Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 307 and was later enacted by Parliament
in The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. VI., c. 89, §2. On the English
law, see LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM ON lNTERNA'rIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 219-222 (1940);
Parry, "The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Definition of Enemy,'' 4 Mon. L. R:sv.
161 (1941). On the use of the control test in South America, see Domke, "Western Hemisphere Control over Enemy I>roperty: A Comparative Survey," 11 LAw & CONT.EM. PROB.
3 (1945).
1s Kind v. Clark, (2d Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 36, cert. den. 332 U.S. 808, 68 S.Ct.
107 (1947); Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 917, cert. den. 333 U.S.
873, 68 S.Ct. 901 (1948); Bishop, "Judicial Construction of the Trading with the Enemy
Act," 62HARv. L. R:sv. 721 at 754-758 (1949).

